The purpose of this appendix is to show that defence is not represented by a round percentage alone. The model separates the institution that must exist on Day 1, the mature annual force, and the capital required to build the equipment fleet.
E.1 Transition setup
The transition budget carries C$58.2 million of one-time Defence and Security setup, including C$20.2 million of capital [BA]. It is included inside the C$4.96 billion transition total. This is the institutional starting point, not the purchase price of a mature military.
E.2 Capability basis
- territorial defence and protection of critical infrastructure;
- airspace surveillance and defence;
- cyber defence and intelligence;
- search and rescue and support during wildfire, flood and other national emergencies;
- a professional land and air component able to respond quickly;
- a geographically distributed trained reserve for depth and mobilisation; and
- interoperability with the United States, Canada and other friendly forces. The model does not attempt to reproduce the Canadian Armed Forces in miniature. Alberta has no coastline and sits inside a continental security system. Expensive strategic functions that are used occasionally can be shared by agreement where that is cheaper than owning them.
E.3 Mature annual force
| Function | Approximate annual allocation |
|---|---|
| Regular forces and operations | C$1.8-2.1B |
| Equipment acquisition and replacement | C$0.9-1.1B |
| Reserve and militia | C$0.5-0.6B |
| Airspace surveillance, intercept, intelligence and cyber | C$0.8-0.9B |
| Bases, infrastructure, search and rescue and resilience | C$0.5-0.6B |
| Continental cooperation and shared allied capabilities | C$0.3-0.4B |
| Total | approximately C$5.0B |
Airspace surveillance and intercept is held at close to its earlier level while other lines fall, because it is the capability Alberta’s neighbours would care about most and the one that cannot be shared or deferred.
E.4 Initial capitalisation
| Capability | Indicative cost | Why this range is used |
|---|---|---|
| Fighter force, 16-20 aircraft | C$5.0-6.5B | Scaled from Canada’s 88-aircraft project at C$27.7B [DND-F35]. Sized for continuous quick-reaction alert. |
| Tactical transport, helicopters and search and rescue | C$1.5-2.5B | Tactical movement, domestic response and search and rescue. |
| Land equipment, vehicles and artillery | C$1.5-2.5B | One professional combined-arms formation plus reserve stocks. |
| Ground air defence, uncrewed systems, cyber and command | C$1.5-3.0B | Wide range because technology and threat requirements change quickly. |
| Bases and infrastructure | C$0.5-2.0B | Lower if the existing Alberta military facilities form part of the federal asset settlement. |
| Indicative total | C$10.0-16.5B | Built over roughly ten to fifteen years. |
At C$10.0 to C$16.5 billion over ten to fifteen years, average build-out spending is roughly C$0.7 to C$1.6 billion a year, and the mature C$5.0 billion annual budget already carries C$0.9 to C$1.1 billion for equipment acquisition and replacement. The build-out is therefore substantially inside the base ledger already. Equipment of this kind is not held in stock: major platforms take years to build and longer to crew.
E.5 Existing bases and the asset settlement
Cold Lake, Wainwright, Suffield and Edmonton facilities are major federal military assets located on Alberta land in Alberta. Whether and on what terms they transfer would be part of the wider asset-and-debt negotiation. If Alberta obtains them, the country begins with airfields, ranges, training land, accommodation and support infrastructure that would cost many billions to recreate. If it does not, the upper end of the infrastructure allowance becomes more important.
E.6 Continental cooperation
The cooperation model is reciprocal rather than a free security guarantee. Alberta could offer base and training access, airspace and weapons ranges, pre-positioning and logistics, radar and communications sites, joint cyber facilities and forces able to operate to NATO-compatible standards.
In return it would seek access to strategic lift, surveillance, warning and other shared continental capabilities. Switzerland's Partnership for Peace relationship demonstrates that interoperability and practical military cooperation do not require NATO membership [NATO-CH]. Alberta's geography is different, but the structural lesson is useful for costing: a smaller country can maintain credible national forces while sharing selected strategic capabilities.
